Is ISIS Losing Its Power?

DIDPress: The Diplomat magazine reported that, with few exceptions, 2025 has been a relatively quiet year for ISIS-Khorasan (ISKP), the official regional branch of the terrorist group ISIS in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This year, ISKP’s propaganda output has sharply declined, and its ability to carry out foreign attacks has weakened. So far in 2025, ISIS has not been involved in any attack plots outside Afghanistan or Pakistan. Meanwhile, the group has not carried out any major high-profile attacks, resorting only to routine operations and targeted assassinations in these two countries.

The current state of ISKP stands in stark contrast to 2024, when the terrorist group expanded its propaganda efforts by adding new languages, conducted attacks abroad in Russia, Iran, and Turkey, and even plotted operations in the West. For Western security officials, ISKP was considered the greatest threat in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

But what has changed in recent months, and what does this mean for ISKP’s evolution as a terrorist group in the region?

Decline in Propaganda and Digital Presence
In recent months, ISKP has struggled to maintain its online presence, with a noticeable drop in propaganda production. In 2024, two of ISIS’s key propaganda tools—the I’lam Foundation and Al-Raud—were dismantled in a coordinated operation by Europol and Eurojust (EU security agencies). These two centers were responsible for creating, managing, and supporting ISIS-affiliated websites and communication channels. Additionally, ISIS’s RocketChat server, Tech Haven, which ISKP relied on, was compromised. The result has been a weakened online presence, new security protocols for operatives, and mass purges of anonymous users from ISIS-linked Telegram channels.

Most significantly, in June, the arrest of a prominent ISKP propagandist known by the alias Khurasan.Lion (real name: Özgür Alton, aka Abu Yaser al-Turki) in a joint Turkish-Pakistani intelligence operation dealt a major blow to the group’s online ecosystem.

This individual, who had close ties to the Al-Azaim media foundation, was reportedly a key distributor of Turkish and English propaganda content and held a substantial amount of cryptocurrency. Since his arrest, ISKP-affiliated users have been posting warnings about online security and evasion tactics. The takedown of I’lam and Al-Raud, combined with Khurasan.Lion’s capture, has severely weakened ISIS’s propaganda machine and heightened digital security concerns among its members.

Diminished Capacity for Foreign Attacks
ISKP’s ability to plan foreign attacks has also declined following the dismantling of a 48-member network linked to its overseas operations. The seven-month operation, conducted by Pakistani authorities with U.S. intelligence support, led to the arrests of key planners behind attacks in Russia and Iran, as well as the 2021 Kabul airport bombing. Sharifullah, the mastermind behind the Abbey Gate attack, was extradited to the U.S. and is now on trial there. These arrests appear to have disrupted ISKP’s ability to organize and execute foreign attacks.

Previously, ISKP’s capacity to conduct foreign attacks was already limited, as—unlike Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Shabaab, or Boko Haram—it lacked territorial control. Holding territory is typically crucial for planning and executing large-scale external operations.

ISKP’s dual-layered organizational structure had allowed it to sustain its foreign attack capabilities despite losing territorial control in Afghanistan. The outer layer consists of decentralized cells across Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the inner core operates in extreme secrecy, focusing on foreign operations.

Key Factors Behind ISKP’s Decline in 2025

1. Damage to the Inner Core: Counterterrorism operations in Pakistan’s Balochistan province have, for the first time, successfully targeted ISKP’s hidden leadership responsible for foreign attacks, leaving the group unable to conduct any overseas operations this year.
   
2. Financial Crisis: The arrest of Khurasan.Lion and the seizure of his cryptocurrency assets have weakened ISKP’s funding. Since the Taliban’s return, the group has increasingly relied on digital currencies rather than traditional funding sources (hawala, extortion, and donations). The killing of Bilal al-Sudani (a key financier) and the arrest of Shamil Hukumat-af in Turkey have further strained its financial network.
   ISKP is now struggling to pay its fighters in Afghanistan, and its QR code-based crypto donation system has proven far less effective than traditional funding streams.
   
3. Clashes with Baloch Insurgents: ISKP, which once maintained a tactical coexistence with Baloch separatists, has now entered direct conflict with them. These clashes have severely restricted ISKP’s operational space in Balochistan, as the group is outmatched in both weapons and manpower.
   Despite these challenges, ISKP has historically survived through regional alliances and tactical shifts. Given today’s unstable geopolitical landscape, the possibility of the group regrouping should not be underestimated.