DID Press: The informal Jangmadang markets have become a vital lifeline for North Korean citizens over the past three decades. These markets emerged on the margins of the state economy, grew rapidly, and are now entering a new phase of confrontation with political power as the government attempts to control and integrate them.
Jangmadang refers to a network of informal markets in North Korea, tracing back to the widespread famine of the 1990s and the period known as the “Arduous March.”
When the state distribution system practically collapsed and the government failed to provide basic necessities, citizens turned to bartering goods and services for survival. These early exchanges gradually evolved into local markets and eventually into a nationwide network of informal trade.
With the expansion of cross-border smuggling from China, the Jangmadang markets broadened their scope to include consumer goods, food, clothing, and various services. This process also gave rise to a new class of wealthy individuals known as the “Donju,” who, relying on their capital and connections, became influential actors in the informal economy and intermediaries close to the government.
Although these markets conflicted with North Korea’s socialist economic model, Kim Jong Un’s government initially did not crack down harshly.
The dependence of large parts of society on Jangmadang, the extensive bribery networks at the local level, and the risk of social instability were major obstacles to suddenly dismantling these markets.
At the same time, the introduction of information-related goods—such as USB drives, mobile phones, and DVDs—turned Jangmadang into a potential threat to the government’s information monopoly.
The COVID-19 pandemic marked a turning point. The border closures in 2020, deployment of paramilitary forces along the frontiers, and the halt of smuggling dealt a severe blow to the informal networks. During the reopening phase, the government tried to shift economic activity into state-supervised exchange centers, and now Jangmadang operators are being forced to integrate into official structures.
Nevertheless, many observers believe that Jangmadang cannot be completely controlled. The same administrative corruption mechanisms and grassroots initiatives that allowed these markets to form are likely to ensure the continuation of North Korea’s informal economy in the future, albeit in a new and more regulated form.