From Kandahar to Haqqani Network: Hidden Vie for Badakhshan’s Gold

DID Press: Gold mining in Afghanistan’s northeastern Badakhshan province has become a key arena of competition among rival Taliban factions, according to informed sources, as expanding Chinese involvement and the influence of powerful figures deepen divisions and fuel local concerns.

Sources say the large “Chehelkan” gold mine in the Shahr-e Bozorg district has for years been the focus of rivalry among Kandahar-based Taliban, the Haqqani network and Tajik Taliban factions, each seeking to control extraction operations and sideline competitors.

According to reports, Badakhshan’s newly appointed Taliban governor, acting on direct orders from the group’s leader and the acting minister of mines, has signed major gold extraction contracts with Chinese companies. The move has effectively excluded local officials from the contracting process.

Local residents say the presence of Chinese workers and engineers in Badakhshan and neighboring Takhar province has increased sharply, with many companies reportedly declining to hire local labor. Witnesses also cite what they describe as dismissive treatment by Taliban officials, further inflaming public dissatisfaction.

Alongside Kandahar-aligned factions, the Haqqani network is also actively seeking to secure mining sites. Qari Muawiya, described by sources as close to Sirajuddin Haqqani, is said to be identifying gold-bearing land and reporting it to senior figures in the network. Disputes between Pashtun members aligned with the two factions have at times escalated into armed clashes, local sources said.

Several sources also point to the prominent role of Haji Bashir Noorzai, a powerful figure and Taliban financier, in the competition over mines. Noorzai, who was previously sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States and is now said to enjoy the backing of the Taliban leader, is reportedly at odds with the Haqqani network as he seeks to assert control over mining operations.

According to local sources, Noorzai has direct influence over gold and gemstone mines in areas including Bikador gold, Karan and Minjan lapis lazuli, Beruj-e Jurm, Khash ruby, and the Doab-e Yaftal Bala gold mine, with many miners compelled to sign contracts with him.

Sources also cite the growing influence of Hafez Abdul Hadi, described as close to the head of intelligence in Badakhshan, in seizing land and mines. He is said to command about 50 irregular armed men and to have confiscated private land without regard for regulations, at times clashing with forces loyal to Fasihuddin Fitrat, the Taliban’s army chief of staff.

According to the sources, fighters loyal to Abdul Hadi killed two of Fitrat’s forces and wounded several others in Yawan district about two months ago. Despite the dispatch of a delegation from Kabul and a ruling in favor of local residents, Abdul Hadi later reasserted control over the disputed land.

Sources say Chinese companies primarily work with Kandahar- and Helmand-based Taliban figures, as well as with Fasihuddin Fitrat and Mawlawi Ayub Khalid. In mines controlled by Pashtun factions, no Badakhshan residents are reportedly employed, even as laborers—an issue that has repeatedly sparked local protests, which were met with harsh crackdowns.

Aside from Fitrat, other Tajik Taliban figures are said to control only a small share of the province’s mining sector, with less than five percent of Badakhshan’s mines under their influence. While some reports have alleged extortion by individuals linked to Fitrat and Amanuddin Mansour, local sources deny those claims.

Taken together, the sources say, Badakhshan’s mining sector has emerged as one of the most significant fronts of intra-Taliban rivalry—one made more complex by Chinese involvement, the role of powerful individuals, ethnic tensions and the influence of Taliban intelligence services, heightening anxiety among local communities.