Taliban Penal Code: A Step Toward Institutionalizing Discrimination, Intensifying Pressure on Afghanistan’s Shiites

DID Press: The disclosure of a document titled “Taliban Courts Penal Code” by the NGO Rawadari has once again intensified concerns over the future of religious minorities in Afghanistan—particularly the Shiite community. The document, consisting of three sections, ten chapters, and 119 articles, could, if implemented, establish a formal legal framework for social, legal, and religious pressure on a significant segment of Afghan society.

One of the most controversial aspects of the code is its explicit distinction between the “rights of free individuals” and the “rights of slaves,” signaling the Taliban’s move toward legally legitimizing archaic and obsolete social models—approaches previously seen in the ideological frameworks of groups such as ISIS. Additionally, the proposed penal system is built on a four-tier social hierarchy that fully separates the clergy from the rest of society, laying the groundwork for wide-ranging legal inequalities.

Human rights organizations have also criticized the code’s harsh stance toward political dissent and its further restriction of women’s rights. However, perhaps the most alarming element is the labeling of followers of non-Hanafi schools of Islam as “innovators”—a designation that effectively turns structural discrimination against Shiites, Ismailis, and Ahl-e-Hadith into a legalized and institutionalized practice.

While the Ismaili and Ahl-e-Hadith communities are relatively small in Afghanistan, the real consequences of this sectarian classification are likely to fall most heavily on Shiites. After Hanafi Sunnis, Shiites constitute the second-largest religious group in the country, with estimates placing their share of the population between 15 and 30 percent. Any discriminatory legislation targeting them would therefore carry far-reaching social and political consequences.

The roots of this hostility extend beyond the Taliban itself. A rigid Deobandi interpretation of Shiism has long provided the ideological foundation for discrimination and violence against Shiites. Over the past decades, the Taliban and its ideological allies—including groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—have carried out widespread atrocities based on local fatwas. One of the most notorious examples was the massacre of at least 8,000 Shiites in Mazar-e-Sharif in the summer of 1996.

In the Taliban’s current period of rule, overt violence against Shiites has decreased. However, this reduction appears less the result of a genuine ideological shift and more a product of political calculations—particularly in relation to Iran. Despite limited engagement between local Taliban leaders and Shiite communities, religious discrimination has persisted in various forms, including restrictions on religious ceremonies, bans on publishing Ja‘fari jurisprudence materials, and troubling reports of Shiite employees being identified and targeted for removal from government institutions.

Against this backdrop, the approval of the Taliban’s penal code signals a shift toward a more aggressive phase in the group’s approach to religious minorities.

There is now a serious concern that the Taliban may exploit this legal framework to intensify pressure and carry out systematic repression of the Shiite population—an outcome that the implementation of this penal code would only make more likely.