Taliban Implements Widespread Administrative Reshuffling Across Provinces, Government Bodies
DID Press: Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Taliban government, announced that based on the directive of Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, the group’s leader, a series of new appointments have been made at the provincial and governmental levels. These changes involve the shifting of governors, deputies, security commanders, and heads of various departments.
According to the announcement, Sheikh Aziz-ur-Rahman Mansoor, former deputy of the Ministry of Guidance, Hajj, and Religious Affairs, has been appointed as the new governor of Parwan. Similarly, Mawlawi Torjan Ahmadi, former deputy of Nimroz province, has been assigned as the governor of Daikundi.
In addition, changes have occurred at the ministry level. Haji Arsala Khoroti, former deputy of finance and administration at the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, has now been appointed as the deputy minister of rural areas in the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Mawlawi Mohammad Rabani Nasih, previously head of cultural and social affairs at the Ministry of Affairs, has been transferred to the position of deputy of finance and administration at the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing.
In the jihad-related sectors, Mufti Mohammad Tahir Ahmad, former member of the Supreme Court Fatwa Department, has been appointed as the head of the Jihadist Heritage Preservation Department. Additionally, Qari Abdul Sattar Saeed will head the department for collecting and organizing jihadist materials, while Qari Ahmadullah Saeed will lead the Jihad Documentation and Archiving Department, and Hafiz Mawlawi Syed Noor Ahmad Saeed will head Jihadist Publications and Libraries.
Changes were also made within the administrative structure, with Mawlawi Nazir Ahmad Nasir, a former member of Mullah Hibatullah’s office, appointed as deputy for monitoring and policy at the Administrative Affairs Department. Mawlawi Abdul Bari Atif, the former deputy of the same department, has now been moved to the position of deputy of public relations at the Prime Minister’s office. Mufti Mohammad Idris Anwari, former governor of Parwan, now heads the cultural and social affairs department of the Administrative Affairs Department.
In security, Mawlawi Aminullah Tayeb, former deputy of the Ministry of Defense’s support division, has been appointed as the security commander of Paktika province. Mawlawi Najibullah Badakhshi, former security commander of Laghman, has been assigned as the deputy of Nimroz province. Mullah Najibullah Rafee, former governor of Daikundi, now heads the general forces of the Supreme Court’s Military Units. Additionally, Mawlawi Mohammadullah Barah has been appointed as the deputy of the support division at the Ministry of Defense, and Mawlawi Mohammad Awwad Saeed as the commander of the training and educational center of the Kandahar police zone.
In Kandahar, Mawlawi Riyazullah Haqqani, former head of a jihadist school in Nangarhar, has been appointed as the head of statistics and information for the province.
Finally, Mawlawi Matiullah Farooqi has been appointed as the deputy head of civil affairs for the Supreme Court Security Forces, while Mawlawi Abdul Razzaq Shakir, former commissioner of Ashkashim port in Badakhshan, has been appointed as the head of Faryab University.
The Taliban’s governance approach is based on a mix of centralized power, organizational loyalty, and prioritizing internal cohesion. The decision-making structure in the Taliban government is highly vertical, with orders flowing directly from Mullah Hibatullah, and appointments are often made based on ideological trust, jihadist experience, and intra-group connections rather than expertise or modern bureaucratic systems. This model strengthens internal cohesion and political control but creates challenges in governance, institutional efficiency, and engagement with the international community. The Taliban continues to build its governance based on its own interpretation of Sharia and tribal traditions, but this model faces serious tests against the complex demands of modern statehood, economic pressures, and the social needs of Afghanistan.