DID Press: Relations between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, once regarded as one of the closest strategic partnerships in the Middle East, have entered a new and more complex phase in recent years—defined less by cooperation and increasingly by rivalry, divergence, and efforts to assert independent regional influence. The shift is most visible in Yemen, prompting analysts to warn of an emerging, long-term “cold war” between the two Gulf powers.
Drivers of Divergence
The origins of the rift can be traced to conflicting objectives in Yemen. Saudi Arabia intervened in 2015 to back the government in Aden and preserve Yemen’s territorial integrity, while the UAE gradually redirected its support toward the Southern Transitional Council, which seeks southern autonomy and control of strategic ports. These divergent agendas steadily eroded early cooperation and deepened strategic mistrust.
Tensions reportedly peaked on January 2, 2026, when Saudi airstrikes targeted positions held by UAE-backed forces, killing 20 separatist fighters—an incident that underscored how rivalry has moved beyond political competition into direct field-level confrontation.
The competition extends beyond Yemen. In Syria, the Horn of Africa, and even in parallel engagement with Israel, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi back different actors and pursue parallel strategies to entrench independent strategic footholds.
Regional and Structural Implications
The Saudi–UAE rivalry has had far-reaching consequences for Gulf cohesion. The Gulf Cooperation Council, once a symbol of regional security and economic coordination, is increasingly fragmented as members pursue autonomous leadership roles, complicating collective decision-making.
Operationally, rivalry has driven the construction of parallel port, logistics, and energy infrastructures. This duplication raises transaction costs, encourages inefficient capital allocation, and weakens regional market integration. In the security domain, backing rival proxy forces has complicated command structures in conflict zones and prolonged instability.
In Yemen, the rivalry has further fragmented the battlefield and reduced incentives for compromise. The arming of competing local allies has complicated crisis management and heightened the risk of intra-coalition clashes, undermining both countries’ leverage over conflict dynamics and increasing escalation risks.
Short-Term Outlook (Next Three Months)
Following the January 2026 incident, political and media tensions are expected to intensify. While direct interstate confrontation remains unlikely, proxy competition—particularly around ports and transport corridors in Yemen—is set to continue. Mediation efforts may emerge, but rapid de-escalation appears improbable.
Medium-Term Outlook (Three to Twelve Months)
Rivalry is likely to become more structured, with both states consolidating influence through local partners, economic instruments, and security networks. Limited clashes between aligned forces remain possible, though large-scale confrontation is still unlikely.
Long-Term Outlook
Over the longer horizon, a durable “cold war” between Saudi Arabia and the UAE appears increasingly plausible—defined by rival security alignments, parallel economic corridors, and competition for regional influence. Direct war between the two states remains improbable due to prohibitive political and economic costs. Both sides are expected to keep competition below the threshold of open conflict, relying instead on proxy, economic, and geopolitical instruments to gain advantage.