US Setbacks from Kabul to the Strait of Hormuz
DID Press: A review of U.S. foreign policy and military doctrine reveals what the author describes as a recurring pattern of costly and interventionist engagements that have drawn Washington into prolonged conflicts. The experience of Afghanistan, the article argues, offers important lessons for the United States as tensions rise around the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
The United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan and its chaotic withdrawal from Kabul are presented as a prominent example of the limits of military power in achieving political objectives. The author argues that Washington’s reliance on overwhelming military capabilities failed to overcome local resistance and ultimately resulted in a prolonged conflict and an unsettled withdrawal.
Afghanistan
The article argues that a key factor behind the difficulties faced by the U.S. military is the inherent limitation of conventional military power when confronted with opponents relying on asymmetric strategies, local knowledge and long-term resistance.
During the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the author says, policymakers in United States and the Pentagon placed considerable faith in air superiority and sustained military operations to weaken local resistance. However, the conflict demonstrated that a force fighting on its own territory can pursue a strategy centered on endurance and attrition, gradually increasing the political and military costs for an intervening power.
The article draws a parallel with the current tensions in the Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz, while acknowledging that Iran differs substantially from Afghanistan in terms of military capabilities, geography and geopolitical weight.
The author argues that U.S. air and naval superiority alone cannot determine the outcome of a conflict in such a strategically important area or guarantee control over critical maritime routes. The article further contends that any acknowledged limitations of air power highlight the challenges facing Washington’s broader military strategy in the Gulf.
Another factor identified in the article is what it calls a “credibility trap”—the political cost associated with acknowledging failure or withdrawing from a prolonged military engagement.
The experience of Afghanistan, according to the author, demonstrated how concerns over the political consequences of defeat can delay strategic withdrawal. The article refers to an analysis by Ross Douthat in The New York Times, using a medical analogy to describe policymakers who seek to avoid being held responsible for an eventual failure.
The article concludes that the trajectory from Kabul to the waters of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates what it describes as the limits of U.S. military power in attempting to reshape political realities far from American territory.
It argues that while U.S. forces may possess the capabilities required for short-term military operations, conventional military power cannot by itself impose lasting political outcomes on societies determined to resist foreign intervention.
The author concludes that unless Washington moves away from what he describes as interventionism and the pursuit of a global-policing role, the United States could continue to face the high costs associated with entering prolonged conflicts.
By Sayed Baqer Waezi — DID News Agency