Taliban Pressure on Shia Institutions Extends from Seminaries to Media and Universities

DID Press: A data-driven report by DID Press shows that between August 27 and October 1, 2026, the Taliban’s measures against a number of institutions associated with Afghanistan’s Shia and Sunni communities in Kabul expanded beyond religious and cultural centres to include media outlets, health facilities and private universities. During this period, the Khatam al-Nabieen seminary was evacuated, Tamadon and Rah-e-Farda television stations were shut down, several cultural, religious and health centres in western Kabul were closed, and the operating licence of Khatam al-Nabieen University was revoked. At the same time, Dawat University underwent a change in management, Salam University was ordered to suspend its activities, and the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice most recently ordered the Kabul branch of Al-Mustafa International University to suspend operations.

Taken together, these developments present a clear picture of expanding Taliban intervention in institutions with religious, educational, cultural, media and social functions.

A Wave of Restrictions on Shia Centres

On September 5, 2026, Taliban forces surrounded the Khatam al-Nabieen seminary in western Kabul. On September 7, they evacuated the building and took control of the facility. Khatam al-Nabieen is one of the largest centres for Shia religious education in Kabul. Forces from the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice entered the compound during the operation and halted its activities.

The action was not limited to the seminary. Khatam al-Nabieen also had educational and university-related activities, and its institutional affairs were connected to Khatam al-Nabieen University and Tamadon TV. The developments surrounding the complex therefore cannot be viewed simply as a dispute over a building.

The Public Relations Office of Hazara and Shia elders in western Kabul was subsequently surrounded by Taliban forces, and several people were detained. During the same period, more than 30 people, including Shia and Hazara elders, journalists and media employees, were detained in connection with these developments.

On September 22, the Khatam al-Anbia Scientific and Cultural Complex in western Kabul was closed, and four people were detained in connection with the centre. Local officials cited “anti-Emirate activities” as the reason for the action, but details of the allegations were not publicly provided.

On October 1, the Al-Zahra Clinic, Tabyan Cultural Centre and Afkar Private School in western Kabul were also closed. The three institutions operated in the health, cultural and religious fields, extending the scope of the measures from educational and religious institutions to social and cultural services.

Media: Tamadon and Rah-e-Farda

Media outlets have also been an important part of this trend.

Tamadon TV was shut down by the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice on June 23, 2026, before the main period covered by this report. The ministry said the broadcaster was affiliated with a political party and was operating on land it described as “state land seized unlawfully.” Tamadon TV rejected the claim concerning ownership of the land and stressed that it had documents relating to its ownership.

After nearly two months of suspension, Tamadon announced on September 5 that it would resume its activities with a focus on online platforms. Although the original closure of Tamadon occurred before the period covered by this report, the case forms part of the broader sequence of developments involving institutions associated with the Shia community during Sunbula and Mizan.

On September 6, Rah-e-Farda TV was also shut down in Kabul and its office was sealed. The broadcaster’s owner, Salman Akhlaqi, was detained. The Afghanistan Journalists Center said the action was carried out on the orders of the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice.

Rah-e-Farda had previously been suspended for a period earlier this year and resumed operations after a change in ownership and the issuance of a new licence.

The closure of Rah-e-Farda is significant in another respect: it occurred at the same time as the Taliban’s actions against the Khatam al-Nabieen seminary and the Public Relations Office of Hazara and Shia elders. In a short period, two well-known media outlets associated with the Shia community — Tamadon and Rah-e-Farda — both faced suspension of their activities, although Tamadon was shut down in June and Rah-e-Farda in September.

At the same time, the Kabul office of Afghan Voice Agency, known as Awa, was closed by the Taliban at the end of September, and several of its employees were detained. This completed another part of the media dimension of the developments and showed that the restrictions were not limited to television broadcasters.

Universities: From Licence Revocation to Management Changes

Alongside the developments involving religious and media institutions, Afghanistan’s private higher-education sector also faced extensive intervention during this period.

On September 16, the Taliban’s Ministry of Higher Education revoked the operating licences of Khatam al-Nabieen Private University in Kabul and its branch in Ghazni, and the activities of both institutions were halted. The ministry cited reasons including failure to comply with its regulations and values. The university’s owner rejected the allegations.

Nearly 4,000 students were studying at the two branches.

The decision is particularly significant because Khatam al-Nabieen University is part of the same broader complex linked to the seminary and Tamadon TV. The case therefore represents an extension of restrictions from a religious institution to a higher-education institution.

On September 20, Dawat Private University entered another stage of the dispute. The Taliban changed the university’s management and appointed new individuals to run it. The university’s founders rejected the move and announced that its educational and administrative activities would remain suspended until its legal status was clarified.

The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice had previously ordered the university to suspend its activities and vacate its buildings.

On September 30, Salam University was also ordered to suspend its activities. University officials said the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Higher Education had asked them either to transfer the university’s management to the Ministry of Higher Education or suspend its activities. At that point, the Taliban had not provided an official explanation for the measure.

A day later, on October 1, the Kabul branch of Al-Mustafa International University also became part of the case. The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice ordered the centre to suspend its activities, while the acting minister of higher education appeared to oppose the order and called for Al-Mustafa’s educational activities to continue.

Therefore, in this specific case, what is confirmed is the issuance of a suspension order by the Taliban’s Ministry of Justice. However, the final implementation of the closure had not been confirmed because of the disagreement between the two ministries.

The case is significant for another reason: Al-Mustafa is an international educational institution, and its Afghanistan branch has been active in various areas of higher education for years. The inclusion of the centre in the restrictions therefore shows that the scope of the developments extends beyond domestic private universities.

What Do the Numbers Show?

If only the cases that occurred between August 27 and October 1, 2026, are considered, at least 12 institutions or cases can be identified in this sequence:

• The Khatam al-Nabieen seminary was evacuated and its building was taken over by Taliban forces.
• The Public Relations Office of Hazara and Shia elders was surrounded and several people were detained.
• Rah-e-Farda TV was shut down and its owner was detained.
• The Khatam al-Anbia Scientific and Cultural Complex was closed.
• Al-Zahra Clinic was closed.
• The Tabyan Cultural Centre was closed.
• Afkar School was closed.
• The Kabul office of Afghan Voice Agency (Awa) was closed.
• The operating licence of Khatam al-Nabieen University was revoked.
• The management of Dawat University was changed.
• Salam University was ordered to suspend its activities.
• The Taliban’s Ministry of Justice ordered the Kabul branch of Al-Mustafa International University to suspend its activities.

Tamadon TV is also part of the same broader sequence. Its closure occurred on June 23, but its return to online activity on September 5 and its direct institutional connection to the Khatam al-Nabieen complex mean that excluding the case from the overall picture would leave out an important part of the developments.

However, these 12 cases are not identical in nature. Some involve complete closures, some licence revocations, some changes in management and others orders to suspend activities.

Therefore, the figure of 12 should not be interpreted as 12 confirmed closures. Rather, it represents the number of institutional cases in which a restrictive measure or direct Taliban intervention occurred during the period.

The Main Issue: Closed Buildings or Lost Opportunities?

The significance of this trend lies not only in the number of centres that have been closed or universities that have faced restrictions. Behind each of these institutions are significant numbers of students, teachers, religious students, employees, patients, journalists and other people who depend on their activities.

At Khatam al-Nabieen University, nearly 4,000 students were studying at its two branches in Kabul and Ghazni. Information published by Al-Mustafa also refers to hundreds of students and dozens of teachers and employees.

Decisions concerning these institutions therefore directly affect the educational and professional paths of thousands of people.

In the health sector, the closure of Al-Zahra Clinic is not simply an administrative decision. It means that a healthcare centre providing relatively affordable treatment to thousands of poor patients has been removed from the service network.

In the media sector, the closure of Tamadon, Rah-e-Farda and Awa limits their capacity to produce and disseminate information to their audiences.

For this reason, measuring the real scale of these developments requires more than simply counting closed buildings. It is necessary to determine how many students and teachers have been prevented from continuing their education, how many media employees have lost their jobs, how many patients have been deprived of healthcare services, and how many cultural and religious activities have been left without alternatives.

One Trend, Multiple Cases

What occurred during Sunbula and Mizan 1405 consists of a series of actions across several different sectors. Their common feature is the direct intervention of the Taliban in the structure and activities of institutions that form part of the religious, educational, media and social networks largely associated with Afghanistan’s Shia community.

The Issue Goes Beyond Institutional Closures

Beyond the legal and administrative arguments presented by the Taliban to justify these measures, the central question is what the cumulative impact of these restrictions will be on Afghanistan’s human capital, social and religious diversity, and social cohesion.

Although Taliban officials regard these actions as stemming from legal and administrative considerations, the significant concentration of restrictions on institutions associated with the Shia community — from seminaries and cultural centres to media outlets and universities — raises the question of whether discriminatory attitudes and structural distrust toward Shia institutions may also lie behind the trend.

The lived experience of Afghanistan’s Shia community and the Taliban’s history of conduct toward this religious and social group provide, according to this report, grounds for answering that question in the affirmative.

Experience in different countries shows that the simultaneous weakening of educational, media, cultural and civil institutions does not end with the closure of several buildings or changes in the management of several centres. It can lead to fewer educational opportunities, restrictions on the free flow of information, weaker social participation and a growing sense of exclusion and marginalization among different groups of society.

In Afghanistan, when a substantial share of these restrictions is directed at institutions belonging to a particular religious community, their consequences can extend beyond education and media, potentially deepening religious divisions and reducing social trust.

At a time when Afghanistan is facing economic crises, the migration of skilled people and a shortage of educational opportunities, any restriction on institutions that contribute to knowledge production, professional training and social services can have long-term and, in some cases, irreversible consequences for human development and national cohesion.

For this reason, this trend should not be assessed solely by counting the number of institutions that have been closed. It should also be examined in terms of its impact on Afghanistan’s educational, cultural and social future, as well as on the position and participation of the Shia community in the country’s broader public structure.