Transit Diplomacy; Central Asia and Regional Transport Strategies
DIDPress: Analytical Article media outlet wrote that since 2020, Uzbekistan has been collaborating with India and Iran on the joint utilization of Chabahar Port. Strategically vital for India, Chabahar reduces both the cost and time of goods transit compared to European and Chinese routes. The Chabahar–Zahedan–Mashhad–Serakhs railway project, financed by India, is nearing completion and will connect to the Khaf–Herat railway, linking Afghanistan to Central Asia with an annual cargo capacity of 3 million tons. Uzbekistan could further enhance its access to Chabahar by connecting Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat.
During the 4th India-Central Asia Dialogue in New Delhi (June 6, 2025), Chabahar Port was highlighted as a critical node linking India to Central Asia, positioning it as a competitor to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. China, Iran, Russia, and India are all vying to expand their transport corridors through Afghanistan into Central Asia. This rivalry risks turning Central Asian republics into arenas of great-power competition, potentially undermining their national interests.
Background
Since 2020, Uzbekistan has collaborated with India and Iran for the joint operation of Chabahar port. For India, the port is strategically significant because it reduces both the cost and time of cargo transit compared to European and Chinese routes. The Chabahar–Zahedan–Mashhad–Serakhs railway project, funded by India, is under completion and will link to the Khaf–Herat railway line. This route connects Afghanistan to Central Asia and has the capacity to transport 3 million tons of cargo annually. Uzbekistan could gain greater access to Chabahar by linking Mazar-i-Sharif to Herat.
Challenges
Iran is pursuing a five-party railway project (China–Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Iran) that will connect Tajikistan to Chabahar via Afghanistan. The Taliban interim government is expanding the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar railway, which could link Afghanistan to Iran and Pakistan, shortening the overland route between Moscow and Delhi.
Meanwhile, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are developing a new route from the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan border to Pakistan. Russia has initiated a feasibility study for the Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar–Chaman corridor. These routes could terminate at Chabahar, intensifying competition with Gwadar port.
These developments pose challenges for Uzbekistan, as its preferred transit route via Kabul may lose importance compared to the Kandahar route. On the other hand, expanding Chabahar’s infrastructure could undermine Gwadar’s position. Russia, aiming to extend the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to Afghanistan, may reroute some exports via Chabahar, especially given instability in Pakistan.
However, the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict could seriously threaten the implementation of Chabahar-related projects, forcing regional countries to reconsider their transport strategies. In such a scenario, renewed attention to Pakistan’s transit capacities might become inevitable.
Conclusion
Uzbekistan’s active role in developing trans-Afghan trade routes promises economic and political gains by boosting its regional transit leverage. However, Tashkent must navigate carefully among global and regional powers whose influence could shape Afghanistan’s transport projects. For Central Asia, diversified access to southern Iranian and Pakistani ports is beneficial—provided intra-regional rivalry is avoided, as it could erode collective competitiveness. A coordinated policy to identify mutually advantageous routes through Afghanistan is essential. Consensus on a unified stance in talks with Afghan authorities is critical to mitigate risks of Taliban decisions swayed by external actors, which may conflict with Central Asian interests.